20. 10. 2022 / Karl Seeley
Ilustrace: Jáchym Bohumil Kartous
Daniel Veselý’s article, “Is Russia truly headed for defeat in Ukraine?” can serve as an example of how important it is to not merely speak about compromise, but also to have a notion of the contents of a possible compromise. Like everyone, presumably, I’m not a fan of nuclear war, and I agree that we can’t rule out the possibility of a nuclear attack by Russia, whether in Ukraine or, less likely, somewhere in the West. And I admit that a potential successor to Putin could easily be a worse opponent than Putin, a more hardened proponent of Russian exceptionalism and the decay of the West. But it’s not clear to me what Mr. Veselý has in mind under the term “a breakthrough in diplomatic negotiations.”
He cites the Washington Post to the effect that “U.S. officials…don’t believe in the outright victory of either side. At the same time, they have ruled out the possibility that they would pressure Ukraine to the negotiating table.” From that, Mr. Veselý concludes that, “It clearly suits the White House to have a long, draining war in Ukraine, the goal of which is to bring Russia to its knees, regardless of the possible catastrophic consequences. However, if we don’t try to start up diplomatic negotiations sooner or later, we will irresponsibly climb further up the ladder of escalation, at the end of which there is terminal nuclear war.”
OK, fine. We should try to start up diplomatic negotiations, we should seek some sort of compromise.
In principle, this is inarguably correct. We also have to keep an eye on the possibility of a compromise that is better than further effort to the uncertain achievement of maximum victory.
But the catch is in the question of the concrete contents of that compromise, and how we get there.
Mr. Veselý writes, “On Tuesday, the head of Russian diplomacy Sergei Lavrov declared that Russia is open to talks with the United States, so long as they bring a serious offer of negotiations. Yet they rejected Lavrov’s comments, as they don’t consider them a ‘constructive and legitimate’ offer. We will never find out whether Lavrov’s offer was ‘constructive and legitimate,’ or a decoy, because we immediately wiped it from the table.”
But Lavrov didn’t actually bring forward any offer. He merely announced that Russia is open to a serious offer of negotiations, but had yet to receive any such serious proposal.
What exactly are the Russians waiting for?
The Ukrainian starting position is already known: territorial integrity in the 1991 borders; repatriation of kidnapped Ukrainians; and reparations for damages caused by the Russians.
The American position is also known: for now, we are supporting Ukraine.
To the extent that this is our affair and not that of the Ukrainians, that’s our offer. If Russia wants something different, then it’s up to them, rather than the US or Ukraine, to clarify what they would envision as a mutually acceptable resolution.
Lavrov would like for Ukraine, with the support of its allies, to negotiate with itself, he would like for them to pull back in the face of Russian aggression, outside the framework of formal negotiations.
I would not be at all surprised if the end of the war doesn’t bring Ukraine everything it wants. Reparations will be a very tough nut to crack. Maybe Ukraine will in the end leave Crimea to Russia. Etc. But it’s impossible to find our way to any conclusion of that sort if Russia doesn’t put forward its own offer. Will they demand international recognition of the annexation of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhie, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts, even though in the first three of those four there are already large areas that they no longer control, and even in Luhansk Ukraine is knocking at the door? Would that be a “serious offer of negotiations” from Russia’s side? I don’t know, but at least it would be a concrete offer, and we could discuss the pros and cons. (Or rather, Ukraine could discuss the pros and cons.)
Obviously, the threat of nuclear war is no joke, but I don’t see how that changes the situation. Assent to nuclear blackmail has its own costs, and they’re not small. It’s clear that the US (and probably the UK and France as well) have conveyed to the Kremlin the range of possible responses to Russian use of a nuclear weapon, and I assume that those responses, even if not necessarily themselves nuclear, are sufficiently horrible for Russia and its military that no mentally competent person would invite them.
It follows that if the leaders in the Kremlin – whether Putin or his substitute – have even a speck of reason, they won’t resort to a nuclear attack.
And if they don’t have that speck of reason, there’s no point in choosing our actions by considerations of how a reasonable, rational opponent would behave.
Compromise is a very important principle. But calling for compromise is worthless without some indication of what sort of compromise we would consider reasonable, tolerable, and achievable.
Mr. Veselý should understand that.
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